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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON

NRO REVIEW COMPLETED



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY

15 August 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR Lieutenant General Carter

SUBJECT: Proposed NRO Aircraft Operations Staff

- References: a. 15 April 63 DNRO memo for DepSecDef [redacted] 25X1
with attached note to DD(R)/CIA
- b. 22 April 63 DNRO memo for DDNRO [redacted] 25X1
- c. 3 June 63 DNRO memo for DDNRO [redacted] 25X1

Attached herewith are copies of the referenced documents, which are forwarded for your personal information in accordance with Dr. McMillan's instructions of this date. References b and c were both intended to clarify the basic intent of the proposed arrangement.

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John L. Martin, Jr.
Brigadier General, USAF
Director, NRO Staff

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15 April 63

Dear Pete,

You will recall I mentioned at our Saturday meeting that I am attempting to establish a more formal tie-in between the NRO and the JCS. The attached recommendation follows the approach I have discussed with Ros. The proposed solution, in addition to effecting formal coordination between the peripheral activities of the JCS and the overflight activities of the NRO, will formalize the coordination by the JCS of the resources of unified and specified commands which may be required to support NRO overflight activities.

In addition, it will insure that the NRO has available the best military operational knowledge and experience, a point on which the Chiefs expressed particular concern during my last discussion with them.

Signed
Brockway McMillan

Dr. H. Scoville, Jr.
DDR/CIA

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15 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR The Deputy Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Operations Aspects of the NRO

In regard to the operations aspects of the NRO, I believe that some clarification of policy is in order. I also believe that the present organizational arrangements are inadequate with respect to capability for operational planning and analysis, and would like to suggest a solution.

The policy question concerns the definition of denied area overflight, and NRO responsibility during active military hostilities. I am proceeding on the basis that denied area overflights are any overflights of sovereign territory for which specific permission must be obtained from the 5412 Special Group or higher authority. As to when the NRO should cease to be responsible for such aircraft overflights, I recommend the policy that this responsibility will be transferred from the Director, NRO to the appropriate military commander upon decision of the Secretary of Defense or higher authority that the area in question has become an active theater of military hostilities.

In regard to the NRO capability for operations planning and analysis, I attach a paper describing a solution which I recommend. I suggest that you discuss this with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Signed

Brockway McMillan
Director
National Reconnaissance Office

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Establishment of
NRO Acft Ops Ctr

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15 April 63

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NRO
AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS CENTER

1. PROBLEM: To define the organizational arrangements whereby the Director, NRO may discharge his assigned responsibilities for aircraft overflight reconnaissance of denied areas.

2. FACTORS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM:

a. The Director, NRO is responsible* to the Secretary of Defense for the establishment, management, and conduct of all overflight of denied areas. He is not responsible** for peripheral reconnaissance, except for the responsibility to coordinate the overflight activities of the NRO with peripheral reconnaissance activities.

b. Since the overflight activities of the NRO may involve some commitment of resources presently or potentially assigned in support of Unified and Specified Commands, there should be appropriate coordination of such NRO activities with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

* DOD-CIA Agreement on NRO, dated 13 March 1963

** Above Agreement, plus Deputy SecDef memo dated 14 June 1962

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c. In accordance with the intent of the reorganization act of 1958, the Joint Chiefs of Staff should direct the operations of the Unified and Specified Commands, as necessary to support or carry out approved NRO overflight missions, rather than these Commands responding directly to the Director, NRO.

d. In order for the Director, NRO to discharge his assigned responsibilities, it is essential that NRO capability be established to plan, evaluate, and coordinate all aircraft overflights of denied areas. This capability must include highly competent personnel with appropriate operational knowledge and experience. At present, the NRO does not have such capability.

3. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS:

It appears that there are only two basic alternatives, although the details of these could be varied somewhat in regard to method of operation. They are:

a. The establishment, within the NRO, of a new office having this capability, obtaining qualified personnel to staff the office from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and CIA. This office would coordinate appropriate matters with the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the Joint Reconnaissance Center, from which all necessary instructions would be transmitted to Unified and Specified Commands after JCS coordination.

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b. The establishment of an organizational arrangement under which the present Joint Reconnaissance Center would serve both the NRO and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The JRC would continue to perform all of its present functions for the JCS, with the addition of the tasks of keeping the Joint Chiefs of Staff appropriately informed on NRO missions, and conveying the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on denied area overflights to the Director, NRO. In addition to functions performed for the JCS, the JRC would serve as the NRO Aircraft Operations Center (AOC). The Chairman of the JRC would serve as the Deputy for Operations on the NRO Staff, responsible for supervision of both the NRO Satellite Operations Center (SOC) and the AOC. An operating charter agreement would be established between the Director, NRO and the Joint Chiefs of Staff defining the above concept of operations. This charter would provide for the JRC personnel, office space, and other appropriate support to be furnished by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the JCS functions as the JRC, and the NRO functions as the AOC separately stated, as in the attachment hereto. The charter would also provide for joint NRO-JCS preparation of the efficiency reports of the Chairman and his Deputy.

4. DISCUSSION:

It is clear that the capability described in alternative "a" must be established unless agreement can be reached to establish the

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
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arrangement described in alternative "b". It would seem that alternative "b" could be established without requiring any increase in the JRC manpower beyond requests currently outstanding. However, alternative "a" would require additional office space and operationally skilled manpower to be transferred to the NRO. Although either alternative undoubtedly could be made to work, the solution of alternative "b" would provide the smoother working interface between the NRO and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and be much more economical in the use of skilled military personnel and critical Pentagon office space. For these reasons, it would seem that alternative "b" is the preferred solution.

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Dual (JCS-NRO) Functions
of the Joint Reconnaissance
Center

**DUAL (JCS-NRO) FUNCTIONS OF THE
JOINT RECONNAISSANCE CENTER**



* Chairman, JRC also serves as Deputy for Operations, NRO Staff.

** JRC and AOC consist of the same personnel and resources: As the JRC, they serve the JCS, and as the AOC, they serve the NRO, in accordance with separately stated functions listed on the following pages.

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1. JCS Functions (as the JRC of the JCS):

a. Review proposed peripheral reconnaissance missions, plans, and programs and transmit to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their consideration those which do not fall within existing guidance, and those which are considered sensitive; i. e., under existing conditions, might seriously affect other U. S. operations and programs.

b. Keep the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed on all proposed reconnaissance operations of particular interest, the results thereof, and requirements generated thereby. Designated representatives will arrange for special presentations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other appropriate government officials. Presentations of NRO activities will be in accordance with policy established by the Director, NRO.

c. Convey decisions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on peripheral reconnaissance matters to commanders and Services concerned.

d. Convey the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on denied area overflight matters to the Director, NRO.

e. Maintain liaison with the Secretary of Defense and Director, NSA.

f. Perform liaison with the National Reconnaissance Office, the Department of State or other government departments and agencies on overflight and peripheral reconnaissance operations to assure that:

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- (1) programs or activities proposed by these agencies are considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, if appropriate;
- (2) the Joint Chiefs of Staff are informed, as required, on such proposed activities and the results thereof; and that,
- (3) coordination with unified and specified commands, and other departments and agencies as appropriate, has been carried out.

g. Perform other related duties as directed.

2. NRO Functions (as the Deputy for Operations, NRO Staff, using the personnel and resources of the JRC as the NRO Aircraft Operations Center ((AOC)), and supervising the existing NRO Satellite Operations Center ((SOC))):

a. Receive for the Director, NRO all requirements for overflight reconnaissance of denied areas, analyze these requirements, establish appropriate mission schedules in response thereto, and assign responsibility for preparation of mission plans to appropriate Service elements, unified and specified commands, and/or the CIA in accordance with assigned responsibilities, and in accordance with basic guidance from the Director, NRO.

b. Review all proposed denied-area overflight reconnaissance missions, plans, and programs, obtaining the recommendations of the

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Joint Chiefs of Staff on all those which do not fall within existing guidance, and on those which are considered sensitive and might affect seriously other U. S. operations and programs.

c. Coordinate the overflight activities of the NRO with the peripheral reconnaissance activities of the unified and specified commands.

d. Obtain approval and/or decisions as required, from the Director, NRO and assist him, as required, in the obtaining of appropriate decisions and authorization from higher authority for conduct of overflight reconnaissance missions. Issue appropriate instructions to the Commands, Services and Agencies concerned to insure execution of approved missions.

e. Monitor all NRO reconnaissance missions, keeping the Director, NRO and other designated officials informed of the mission status, progress, and results.

f. Prepare monthly forecast of all NRO missions for submission to the Special Group. Assist the Director, NRO, as required, in the presentation of the National Reconnaissance Program to the Special Group and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

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
g. Maintain NRO liaison with the DLA and the USIB in regard to all requirements for intelligence, mapping and geodesy collection by overflight of denied areas.

h. Specify desired targets to be covered by satellite missions, desired on-orbit target program options (to the extent that such options exist within the system capability of individual projects), and make all on-orbit selection between such options, based upon weather or intelligence factors.


i. Perform other related duties as directed.

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22 APR 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR Deputy Director, NRO

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SUBJECT: NRO Aircraft Operations

Reference: DNRO memo for the DepSecDef. subj: Operations Aspects of the NRO, dtd 15 April 63 [redacted] with attachment [redacted]

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Further to my 15 April note transmitting to you a copy of the referenced document, and to our subsequent discussion of this matter, I should like to clarify the intent of the proposed arrangement.

The proposed arrangement would have no effect whatever on the aircraft operations responsibilities presently carried out by the Director, Program B, or the functions of the CIA OPCEN. The Director, Program B, would continue to be responsible for preparation of operations plans for conduct of NRO aircraft overflights through use of aircraft and/or drones of projects for which responsibility is assigned to the Director, Program B. He would continue to be responsible for coordination of these proposed activities and arrangement for necessary support in exactly the same manner as presently employed.

However, the proposed arrangement would fill in some important missing links in the present NRO organization and procedures. Upon receipt of plans for proposed aircraft overflight activities, prepared by the Director, Program B for signature of the Director, NRO to the Special Group requesting approval to proceed, the Deputy for Operations, NRO Staff would review the proposed plans, obtain any necessary coordination with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, together with any recommendations or comments which might be appropriate. He would effect coordination of the proposed overflight activities with the peripheral reconnaissance program operated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and would discuss with the Director, NRO the results of his coordination and any comments or recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the event that the work of the Deputy for Operations should result in no recommendations for

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change to the original proposals, or in the event that the Director, NRO should not concur with such recommendations which do result, the Director, NRO would sign and forward to the Special Group the original plans as prepared and transmitted by the Director, Program B. In the event that the Director, NRO should consider that changes should be made, he would discuss such changes with the Director, Program B, following which the Deputy for Operations would prepare a revised plan for the Director, NRO to forward to the Special Group. The Deputy for Operations, NRO Staff would arrange with the Director, Program B to be kept currently advised as to the status of each overflight in order that the Director, NRO Staff and appropriate JCS personnel could monitor actual progress of all NRO aircraft overflights.

Although the above procedure would result in an additional coordination step, it seems to me that this additional step is absolutely essential to the establishment of a sound NRO management structure. Present NRO aircraft overflight activities do involve support of resources presently or potentially assigned to unified and specified commands; for instance, the 4 April memorandum for the Special Group [redacted] as presented to me for signature contained an outline of a proposed operational concept involving use of command resources under the auspices of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as proposing the use of certain equipment in a manner to which the Joint Chiefs had previously expressed strong objection. As you know, certain future NRO plans will involve much more extensive support from resources under the control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Therefore, I feel that a formal mechanism must be established for coordinating these proposed activities with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a workable, responsive basis consistent with the security restrictions which must apply. In addition, I would observe that the NRO, from its earliest inception, has been under the mandate to establish coordination of all NRO overflight activities with the peripheral reconnaissance program, and it is evident that so far no such formal coordination arrangements have been established. I also consider that there is merit in the concern recently expressed to me in a meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the NRO have adequate support of military personnel with appropriate operational knowledge and operational experience.

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It would seem to me that all of these objectives can be met most easily, and with no effect on the CIA or the Director, Program B, by the arrangement proposed in the referenced memorandum.

Signed

Brockway McMillan
Director
National Reconnaissance Office

cc: DepSecDef
Chmn JCS

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Col Martin, [] 3 June 63

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3 JUN 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR The Deputy Director, NRO**SUBJECT: NRO Staff Functions of the JCS Joint Reconnaissance Center**

- References:
- a. DNRO 22 April 63 memo for Deputy DNRO.
subject: NRO Aircraft Operations []
 - b. Deputy DNRO 29 April 63 memo for DNRO.
subject: NRO Aircraft Operations []

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I have considered your views and suggestions outlined in reference b, and am happy that you feel reference a has clarified and satisfactorily explained the position of the CIA in the proposed establishment of an aircraft operations office within the NRO Staff. However, in regard to your concern that the basic proposal is cumbersome and involves fundamental management weaknesses, I feel that one essential point should be emphasized further. The proposed capability is strictly and solely an over-all NRO staff function; it is not intended to serve as a line function or to replace the staff functions of line elements within the NRO. Consequently, as I pointed out in reference a, the proposed arrangement will not affect the responsibilities presently carried out by the Director, NRO Program B. Furthermore, since the JRC duties for the NRO are staff, rather than line, duties, and since these duties will be defined, the responsibility of the Chairman of the JRC will be clear: he will be responsible to the Director, NRO, for his specified NRO staff duties, and to the JCS for his specified JCS duties. Neither he nor I anticipate any particular difficulties on this point.

Your alternate proposal of a Director, NRO Program E would insert a line organization into the Joint Staff, which, at best, would be extremely awkward, and not at all responsive to the problem. The line elements associated with NRO aircraft reconnaissance are satisfactorily organized within the DOD and the CIA, including the staffs of these line elements. The present problem is to establish an over-all NRO staff for the Director, NRO.

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- 3. SS-1
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I enclose a copy of the response of the Secretary of Defense to the views and recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this subject. As stated in paragraph b, the Secretary requests final JCS/Director, NRO concurrence by June 10, 1963. I should like to have any further comments you may wish to make as soon as possible in order that I may conclude discussions with the Chiefs before that date.

Signed
Brockway McMillan
Director
National Reconnaissance Office

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[redacted] with
Attachments I & II

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